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Abstract This article aims to contribute to the academic debate on the general crisis faced by law 
schools and the legal professions by discussing why juristic practice is a matter of experience rather 
than knowledge. Through a critical contextualisation of Vilhelm Lundstedt’s thought under processes 
of globalisation and transnationalism, it is argued that the demise of the jurist’s function is related to 
law’s scientification as brought about by the metaphysical construction of reality. The suggested 
roadmap will in turn reveal that the current voiding of juristic practice and its teaching is part of the 
crisis regarding what makes us human.  
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In the objective content of science [the] individual features are forgotten and effaced,  
for one of the principal aims of scientific thought is the elimination of all personal and anthropomorphic 
elements 
Cassirer (1944, p. 228) 
 
[In the Western legal tradition] [t]he law contains within itself a legal science, a meta-law, by which it can be 
both analyzed and evaluated 
Berman (1983, p. 8)  
 
 
Introduction  
 
Terence C. Halliday and Gregory Shaffer have recently noted that ‘[s]ocial orders 
increasingly are legalized transnationally’ (2015, p. 3). This can be hardly disputed: our 
existence is in fact highly legalised, and law is being pervasively practised (Hadfield 2016, p. 
59). The proliferation of transnational judicial networks and forms of cooperation, as well as 
the emergence of multiple methods of legalisation on the post-national scale and evolving 
interest in (transnational) comparative legal analysis, are just some of the many examples one 
might give in this regard (Michaels 2016; Lupo and Scaffardi 2014; Mak 2013; Cohen 2012; 
Kennedy 2008).  
Yet over the past decade, a great deal of scholarship has claimed that law schools and the 
legal professions are witnessing an existential crisis for a variety of reasons—including the 
inability of teachers to efficiently educate their students for the highly-contested market 
environments, the increasing difficulty for graduates to enter the professional world, the 
incapacity of contemporary legal infrastructures to cope with the pace of innovation, and the 
growing reliance on technological means to perform legal tasks1 (Hadfield 2016, pp. 3, 59, 
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79, 81; Stratas 2016; Barton 2015; Dewan 2015; Banakar and Traves 2013; Tamanaha 2012; 
Westerman 2011; Susskind 2013; 2010; Scott 2005).2 
While the solution to this paradoxical trend is yet to be found, it has become increasingly 
clear that its essence and extent force us to interrogate anew the role of the jurist within 
current processes of legalisation around the global and on a transnational scale. In this sense, 
some commentators might object that jurists have been confined to a secondary role in the 
past as well, such as when (with the exception of Germany, until 1871) the modern raison 
d’état largely rendered legal academics spectators of the law’s authoritarian administration. If 
anything, this indicates that the trajectory of our reflections on the past and present status of 
the legal enterprise in its various official branches (teaching, practising, adjudicating, 
legislating, etc.) is ultimately determined by whether we think of law as a science that 
transcends the intermediation of man, or as a matter of practice (either moral or political) and 
experience that cannot do without it (Berman 1983, p. 39; Coyle and Pavlakos 2005; Van 
Hoecke 2011).  
While scholars are still divided on this definitional point, they tend to agree that the 
current crisis of legal education and practice can only be overcome through a neorealist and 
contextual commitment to the rediscovery of law’s regulative purposes and how to teach it. 
This intellectual roadmap is centred around the belief that the difficulties encountered by the 
jurist under processes of globalisation and transnationalism may only be overcome through a 
reconsideration of the axiomatic findings and statements that characterise our understanding 
of legal academics’ role within the social and legal dimensions, as well as of the perspectives 
from and methodologies through which we have come to form our insights into it (Hadfield 
2016, pp. 5–9, pp. 199–277; Rhode 2015; Zumbansen 2015a; Arjona, Anderson, Meier, and 
Sierra, 2015; Susskind 2013, 2010; Twining 2009, 2013; von Bogdandy 2009, 2013; Gordley 
2008).  
Recently I showed that the activity of jus dicere, or rule-telling through juristic practice, 
will gradually become superfluous in the form of society that is currently emerging at the 
global and transnational level (Siliquini-Cinelli 2016a, 2016b). This is due to the fact that 
law’s juridical component is increasingly incapable of embracing the reality of contemporary 
forms of regulation. Simply put, the reason for this is to be found in the global and 
transnational diffusion of the ‘action to rational behaviour’ and ‘experience to knowledge’ 
shifts. The substitution of action and experience with rational behaviour and knowledge lies 
at the core of the Western metaphysical tradition. The implications of the post-national 
expression of this phenomenon ought not to be underestimated. It is indeed becoming 
increasingly difficult to comprehend that in terms of juris genesis, to perform its regulative 
instances law needs humans to inter-act freely and define themselves as persons in Arendtian 
terms through an act of experience. This self-defining form of interaction has then to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
on Tuesday 4 April 2017. Among the many friends and colleagues to whom I am indebted, for many and 
different reasons, I particularly wish to thank Joel Samuelsson, Martin Kraigh, and Stella Marceta for inviting 
me to Uppsala. I am also grateful to Torben Spaak, Markku Helin, Brian Z. Tamanaha, James Gordley, Roger 
Cotterrell and two anonymous reviewers for constructive comments on earlier drafts, as well as all to those who 
provided me with valuable suggestions. Errors are mine only. 
 
1 It should be noted, however, that other professions are also losing their hold owing to technology (Croft 2017; 
Crain Miller 2016; Staglianó 2016; Susskind and Susskind 2015).  
2 See also the 2016 Consultation Paper – Ministry of Justice and Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunal Service 
Proposal on the Provision of Court and Tribunal Estate in England and Wales, available at 
https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/proposal-on-the-provision-of-court-and-tribunal-
es/user_uploads/reform-estates-national-consultation_official-sensitive_final.pdf (last accessed: April, 17, 
2017).  
3 
 
normativistically interpreted by a figure, the jurist, among whom stands the judge,3 through 
the formulation of (and answer to) a quaestio juris. The substitution of action with reason-
oriented behaviour and experience with knowledge has voided this task of its anthropological 
and sociopolitical significance. 
In the same context, I suggested that the negative trend that affects the teaching, learning 
and practice of law will persist as long as we do not internalise that (1) these activities are 
dependent upon the anthropological and sociopolitical function of the jurist; and that (2) the 
activity of jus dicere itself is a matter of self-defining and imperfect experience rather than 
self-dissolving and scientific knowledge. By this I do not mean that knowledge (and thus, 
also knowledge of the law) is not achievable, per se (Pavlakos 2007, p. 1; Somek 2017, pp. 1, 
84). Rather, what I intended to show is that it is experience, not knowledge, that defines the 
apprehension and exercise of juristic practice. This experiential nature, I further maintained, 
cannot be rediscovered until we recognise that, in the West, the substitution of experience 
with knowledge has occurred along that of action with rational behaviour.  
In my earlier work I substantiated these claims through a two-step analysis: firstly, I 
delved into the role that the categorisation of law as scientia juris and tékhnē has played in 
the development of the Western legal tradition, from Irnerius to current post-national 
theorists; secondly, I contextualised the function that the metaphysical and ontological 
metamorphosis from jus to lex4 has had in the scientific conceptualisation of law. In doing so, 
I also showed that the spark of this process ought to be found in what Stoicism brought to 
Rome, mainly through Panaetius and Polybius: the structuring of thinking and language. 
In this article, I would like to elaborate further on the crisis of juristic practice and its 
apprehension 5  by taking a lateral step and addressing its non-metaphysical, experiential 
nature through the lens of Vilhelm Lundstedt’s legal realism. More particularly, my aim is to 
ascertain whether Lundstedt’s thought, which is tied very closely to the social welfare 
understanding(s) of a shared community (Cotterrell 2016), may offer new insights into how 
to untangle jurist practice’s loss of social relevance in a global and transnational age, such as 
ours, characterised by the behaviouralisation and standardisation of human existence and 
relations, as well as by diffusionist processes of diversification or fragmentation—that is, by 
the pluralisation of regulative sources and norm-setting bodies at the macro, meso, and micro 
levels, as well as by ‘regime-shifting’ mechanisms (Raunig 2013; Agamben 2012; Friedman 
2007; Adorno and Horkheimer 2002; Adorno 2001; Zumbansen 2013; Zürn and Faude 2013; 
Teubner 2013, 2012, 2004, 1997; Teubner and Korth 2012; Handl, Zekoll, and Zumbansen 
2012; Head, Krisch 2010;. 
As is well known, Aristotle believed that only scientific knowledge is capable of being 
passed on to others, whereas what is apprehended through experience cannot. 6  This 
constructivist approach to teaching and learning has profoundly shaped the development of 
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the Western tradition, including that of its jurisprudential branch (Stein 1980, pp. 33–36; 
Berman 1983, pp. 120–64; Padoa Schioppa 2007). Hence it comes as no surprise that the 
above-mentioned interrogative as to whether law is a science or a matter of (either moral or 
political) practice and experience has been discussed at length. An important figure in this 
debate, Lundstedt opted for a hybrid categorisation and contended that the conceptualisation 
of ‘law’ as a system of rights and obligations ought to be abandoned. Rather, scholars should 
speak of ‘legal machinery’, to be understood as a system of behavioural regularities that can 
be known scientifically. This is because rights and duties are not immanent entities, and as 
such cannot be the objects of scientific scrutiny as is commonly thought. To argue that law 
and legal thinking ought to be based on value judgements would lead us to believe that they 
can be either true or false, even though nothing can be used to assess them scientifically. 
Hence, to Lundstedt, law is better understood as a ‘legal machinery’ of stable connections 
and causations whose dynamism is determined by the (inverted) ‘effect-cause’ relationship. 
This empiricism led Lundstedt to reject traditional (i.e., ideological) legal science in favour of 
a newly scientific jurisprudence that is still based on experience—that is, on the practical 
observation and analysis of social facts. 
Unsurprisingly, Lundstedt’s reflections on law and legal thinking have attracted a 
considerable degree of interest, particularly in relation to the development of Scandinavian 
legal realism and the so-called ‘Uppsala School’ (Cotterrell 2016; Bindreiter 2016; Spaak 
2014; Petrusson and Glavå 2012; Sundell 2010; Zamboni 2006, 2002; Helin 1988, pp. 431–
47; Lagerqvist Almé 1986; Sundberg 1986; Campbell 1958). Of particular relevance for the 
purposes of this inquiry is a compelling essay written by Bjarup in which the reader is 
presented with a critique of the role Scandinavian legal realists assign to behavioural 
regularities. Bjarup concluded that article by outlining the perils of such a naturalist approach 
for legal education (2005, p. 15). The project that I propose here is to push this critical 
analysis one step farther and reflect on both the values and weaknesses of Lundstedt’s 
reasoning from the perspective of the difficulties that affect legal practice and its teaching and 
learning in our age. 
More specifically, in the following pages I shall argue that while Lundstedt’s critique of a 
metaphysical approach to law and legal thinking is worthwhile, his notion of law reproduces 
the same metaphysical fallacy he aims to overcome. This is due to the fact that Lundstedt 
focuses his efforts on the essence of metaphysic as the realm of the ideal and suprasensory, 
without paying enough attention to its function, that is, to the reason why metaphysics 
transcends factual beings and phenomena and our experience of them. Unfortunately, this 
means that Lundstedt fails to grasp that metaphysics’ ultimate aim is to structure human 
existence and relations through logic’s ground-giving properties. Put bluntly, this also means 
that Lundstedt ignores, or appears to ignore, that every science, even the jurisprudential one 
whose formation he advocates, is by definition a metaphysical construct that nullifies the self-
defining properties of its objects.  
Once this critical aspect is added to the reading of Lundstedt’s legal realism, it becomes 
manifest that both his understanding of law as a machinery governed by the ‘effect-cause’ 
relationship as well as his use of logic to support his arguments lead us back to the purview of 
metaphysics. As will be seen, this explains why Lundstedt’s natural-scientific world view 
blurs the distinction between experience or practice and knowledge, as well as the structural 
relationship between knowledge and scientific (and thus, metaphysical and logical) inquiry. 
Importantly, this also serves to clarify why, as recently noted by Spaak (2014, pp. 270–1), 
Lundstedt has nothing to say on law-making and law-applying procedures: once the legal 
dimension is understood as a machine automatically governed by some kind of logic (in 
Lundstedt’s case, that of behavioural regularities), the need for coordinating human 
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interaction and making sense of it normativistically through juristic practice becomes 
irrelevant. 
Consequently, Lundstedt’s reflections cannot help us internalise either what constitutes 
law’s juridical component, or the reasons for its demise. Rather, I conclude that the challenge 
of comprehending what the activity of jus dicere is about as well as why it is increasingly 
becoming superfluous in our global and transnational age will not be met as long as the 
distinction between knowledge and experience is not rediscovered within legal discourse, and 
the latter preferred over the former. As such, my argument ultimately aims to show the 
paradox that underpins cognitivist legal theories, all of which ‘agree on the central role of 
practice for legal knowledge’ (Pavlakos 2007, p. 3; emphases added). 
This paper is structured as follows. Section II outlines those contentions put forward by 
Lundstedt that are of particular significance for the purposes of our inquiry. Section III offers 
a critique of Lundstedt’s views by elaborating on the relevance of the ‘action-behaviour’ and 
‘experience-knowledge’ dichotomies to  the law’s coordinating purposes and the 
apprehension of juristic practiceConcluding remarks follow. 
 
Lundstedt’s ‘Legal Machinery’ 
 
Lundstedt clarifies from the very beginning of his Legal Thinking Revised that from the time 
of his encounter with Axel Hägeström, he aimed at ‘mak[ing] of jurisprudence a science’ 
(1956, p. 5). This roadmap was pursued by rejecting legal ideology and replacing it with the 
so-called ‘social welfare’ paradigm (pp. 6, 9, 21, 124–5). According Lundstedt’s view, there 
is indeed no such thing as an ‘objective’ or ‘material’ law composed of ‘rules, maxims, 
principles, norms, precepts, prescriptions, commands, etc.’ (p. 23; see also pp. 31, 17, 165). 
Scholars should therefore abandon these ideological ‘fancies’ (pp. 123) and opt for an 
‘empirically based [method of] investigation’ (ibid.) that might render jurisprudence truly 
scientific (1932, p. 327). 
To substantiate his claim, Lundstedt argues that traditional jurisprudence is unscientific 
because its concepts (i.e., ‘rules of law’, ‘wrongfulness’, ‘objective legal duties’, ‘objective 
guilt’, ‘legal rights’, ‘natural justice’, and, more importantly, ‘legal norms’; 1956, pp. 42, 43, 
77) are produced by ‘value judgements’, that is, by judgements that ideologically depend on 
‘feelings’, and thus differ from proper (i.e., scientific) judgements (p. 45; see also 1932, p. 
328). Lundstedt concedes that feelings have a fundamental impact on the ‘common sense of 
justice’ (1956, pp. 137, 165), and that that sense is structurally related to the functioning of 
the aforementioned ‘legal machinery’.7 However, Lundstedt also stresses several times that 
this way of reasoning is wholly illogical and has determined the ‘fanciful construction’ of an 
‘absurd method of justice’ whose consequences are simply ‘unacceptable’ because they are 
not ‘in accordance with real life’ determinations (pp. 47, 48, 50, 54, 60, 63, 124, 129, 160).  
A similar argument is put forward in Superstition or Rationality in Action for Peace?, which 
was published in 1925. It is important to note that Lundstedt follows logic when he asks 
jurists not to be concerned with the metaphysical world of ideas and objective values: as he 
himself writes, ‘[i]f one assumes at all a world beyond the connection in time and space, the 
consequence must of necessity be that the physical world, existing in time and space, must 
disappear’ (1932, p. 328; see also p. 329). Regrettably, however, scholars have never been 
capable of freeing themselves from the shackles of metaphysical thought. As a result, the 
whole of European jurisprudence is affected by this illusory concept of natural, ideological 
justice (1956, pp. 285–300, 1932, p. 326).  
                                                          
7 Discussed below. 
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This is where the ‘effect-cause’ reversal appears in Lundstedt’s reflections. While Western 
jurisprudence, under the influence of the metaphysical tradition, has always thought of rights 
as an a priori source of legal rules, to Lundstedt these are to be understood as arising out of 
the legal machinery’s operativity (1956, pp. 93–100). As reality ‘has [been] turned . . . 
completely upside down’ (p. 100), a naturalistic turn must therefore occur: from 
understanding rights as the cause of ‘legal coercive reactions’ to conceiving of them as the 
effect (p. 98). This methodological shift, which Lundstedt outlines by describing the illogic 
that underlies conventional (i.e., ideological) approaches to transfer of property and hire (pp. 
93–100, 110, 114, and 115–18 respectively), will ultimately serve to displace the ‘false idea 
of legal rights’ that has underpinned the development of legal thinking to date. This indicates 
that, as Olivercrona correctly noted, Lundstedt is of the opinion that ‘the judge cannot 
ascertain the existence of a right as a prerequisite for the infliction of a sanction’ (p. 137). 
With these words, Lundstedt paves the way for his notion of legal science as that branch of 
rational, logical inquiry that abandons the unreal concept of ‘law’ and opts instead for that of 
‘legal machinery’, whose functioning is dynamically governed by the inverted ‘effect-cause’ 
relationship.8 More precisely, as Bindreiter has set out, the legal machinery is to Lundstedt a 
‘regular enforcement of coercive acts, following upon certain modes of behaviour’ (2016, p. 
382). This machinery therefore should not be seen as a metaphysical system of rights and 
duties, but as a terrain of causal connections that ought to be placed at the centre of the legal 
theorist’s considerations and lawmaker’s norm-production initiatives. As will be seen below, 
however, the law-making process exerts a counter-influence on the formation of social 
interests and expectations. 
And indeed, Lundstedt stresses that for jurisprudence to become a science, scholars must 
do two things: first, they must reject all the ‘“starting points”, “facts” and “connections” 
which are not given in time and space’ (1956, p. 122; see also p. 286); and second, they must 
opt for a naturalistic (p. 129) approach to legal inquiry based on experience (pp. 126, 128), 
which Lundstedt depicts as the vehicle for the formation of a ‘constructive jurisprudence’ that 
‘imparts knowledge about actual facts and (causal) connections as well as reasons from 
epistemological points of departure’ (p.131). In other words, experience is, or ought to 
become, the source of knowledge (see also Bindreiter 2016, p. 380).9 However, Lundstedt 
further notes, jurisprudence can never become a fully-fledged science in the strict sense of the 
term: given that at times lawyers cannot avoid dealing with ‘more or less strong hypotheses 
instead of facts’ (1956, p. 126), there will always be a certain degree of uncertainty when it 
comes to understanding, and moulding, the law’s operativity. The unavoidability of 
evaluations, then, renders jurisprudence only a partly scientific endeavour.10 
From this follows the need to conceive of legal science as a ‘constructive juridik’. With 
this term Lundstedt refers to a segment of scientific analysis that focuses on the link between 
law and the preservation of society (p. 132). More particularly, constructive juridik must do 
the following: (1) ascertain whether the maintenance of a given law serves ‘to ensure the 
greatest benefit to society, or . . . a social function’ (p. 134); (2) ‘regarding the interpretation 
of so-called valid law . . . expound [it] . . . so that its consistent application  . . . can be 
anticipated to benefit society as much as possible’ (ibid.; emphasis in original); and (3) ‘in its 
systematization of laws . . . consider the historical as well as the actual significance of legal 
ideology’, but only as a way to overcome its metaphysical essence (ibid.). 
                                                          
8 See also Castignone (1986, p. 270). 
9 For a detailed analysis of the evolution of the term ‘constructive’ in German and Scandinavian jurisprudence 
since its mid-nineteenth century inception, see Bindreiter (2011). 
10 This is an argument that ought to be evaluated within what Lundstedt argues in another work of his, written in 
German and entitled The Non-Scientific Character of Legal Science. 
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Hence, according to Lundstedt’s constructive legal science, it is for the jurist to evaluate 
the functioning of the legal machinery. If properly understood, then, jurisprudence might help 
construct a model of society that is in line with the legislator’s view on what social welfare is. 
Lundstedt’s theory of legal thinking assumes in this sense a truly political essence: as 
Zamboni has noted, one might think that Lundstedt was ‘trying to give birth to a scientific 
approach to the politics of law’ (2002, p. 35). Needless to say, for this to be done, the jurist 
must first and foremost understand why the law’s function is to preserve society. 
Here is where Lundstedt discusses his empirically-led conceptualisation of social welfare 
(samhällsnyttan) as both the telos of law and practical guide for jurisprudential evaluations 
(p. 137). Simply put, this notion comprises all those aspirations ‘which people in general 
strive to attain’ (p. 140; emphasis in original) and that the development of the legal 
machinery requires one to take into pivotal consideration. Among these aspirations stands ‘a 
general sense of security as concerns enterprising activities as well as other modes of action 
not harmful from a social point of view’ (pp. 137–8). Lundstedt himself writes that ‘neither 
the law-maker nor the constructive legal scientist would find any guidance for [his or her] 
activity but [in] the objects which the citizens in common actually strive to realize’ (p. 146). 
It is important to note that, as people’s aspirations and needs lead to social evaluations of 
their communal life, the jurist must also base his or her reflections upon their empirically 
verifiable content (p. 148). 
This view of the jurist’s social responsibility is combined with that of humankind’s social 
instinct, which Lundstedt describes as a psychological disposition ‘to build up society and to 
maintain it in order to live there’ (p. 161). As it emerges during Lundstedt’s discussion of 
Criminal law’s social function (pp. 50, 229), this communitarian attitude plays a fundamental 
role in the framing of his legal machinery paradigm as well. The reason for this is that it leads 
to a double-featured phenomenon: on the one hand, humankind’s sociability informs the 
drafting and enforcement of what is commonly known as legal rules; on the other, given that 
human beings’ existence and relations are always influenced by their sociological nature, 
‘legal rules’ turn out to influence behaviour and expectations (Zamboni 2002, p. 44). 
Lundsted’s framing of the inverted ‘effect-cause’ relationship is based upon analytical 
elaboration of the working logic of this phenomenon (1956, pp. 166–7). Before addressing it, 
however, it should be noted that dismissal of the ‘common sense of justice’ ought to be 
evaluated in this realist light, as it simply does not reflect ‘what is useful to mankind’ (p.  
161; see also pp. 162–4). Lundstedt, however, promptly clarifies that this approach to the 
legal enterprise does not make him a utilitarian, as his concern is not with individual 
aspirations, but with those of the larger society (p. 141). This organicist view is put forward 
by addressing Alf Ross’s critical comments on Lundstedt’s thought as well as in comparing 
the workings of society with those of a company (pp.  172–80).11 
Crucially, Lundstedt also notes that either the legislator may base his or her evaluations 
upon ‘false conceptions’ regarding the people’s aspirations, or the laws enacted may not 
reflect them sufficiently (1956, p. 144). Hence, a discussion follows on how the lawmaker, 
who is a ‘servant’ of society, should be influenced by the heterogeneity of social valuations 
so that the law may efficiently benefit its members (pp. 149–56, 173–8). This eventually 
causes Lundstedt to return to what he had anticipated a few pages earlier regarding law’s 
regulative function being ‘necessary for the maintenance of the social economy’ (p. 156).  
Building upon this contention, Lundstedt provides a more detailed account of how ‘certain 
social welfare interests leave their mark on [the] legal machinery which in . . . in turn guides 
and maintains the common sense of justice (p. 161). He confirms this a little later, only to 
                                                          
11 Criticism has been raised against this approach for resembling totalitarian sentiments (Campbell 1958, p. 
568). 
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stress that, despite such influence, ‘basing law on the common sense of justice is the same as 
putting the cart before the horse’ (p. 169). Yet it would be an unforgivable mistake not to 
admit that ‘there is a kind of interaction’ between the two (ibid.). The point, however, is that 
it is the legal machinery that informs ‘feelings of justice’, not vice versa (p. 170). And indeed, 
the logic that informs the above-described ‘effect-cause’ reversal proves to be fundamental in 
this respect as well: As Lundstedt himself writes, ‘without the rules of law . . . the common 
sense of justice would lose precisely the points of support which are absolutely necessary for 
the indispensable role which it plays in the social organization, in the legal machinery’ 
(ibid.). Conversely, ‘if the legal machinery stopped functioning[,] the feelings of justice 
would lose all bearing and control’ (ibid.).  
Having thus argued, Lundstedt then returns to what he had anticipated previously and 
insists that the task of jurisprudence as legal science is to use experience to gain ‘knowledge 
about reality’ (p. 196;12 see also pp. 201, 206). The method of social welfare is in this sense 
to be developed ‘axiomatically’ and based on ‘direct conceptions of reality’: only through the 
observation and epistemological understanding of social expectations (pp. 197–8, 206–7) and 
behavioural regularities (which at times Lundstedt also refers to as ‘causal connections’; p. 
215)13 can legal activities achieve their aim of preserving public utility and dispelling the 
‘chimera’ of legal ideology’s belief in ‘justice belonging to a metaphysical world’ (p. 196; 
see also p. 215). This can be further shown, Lundstedt maintains, by contextualising the 
social welfare paradigm within the working logic of Civil and Criminal law—an analysis that 
duly follows (pp. 217–69). 
Finally, before concluding the second part of his manuscript by outlining why and how the 
common method of justice has contaminated European jurisprudence (pp. 285–300), 
Lundstedt discusses why his constructive juridik is logically incompatible with it (pp. 269–
85). Of particular significance is the critique of Philip Heck’s jurisprudence of interests 
(Interessenjurisprudenz), which Lundstedt relates to the ‘free judge movement’ and dismisses 
for being ‘untenable from a scientific point of view’ (p. 274). The reason for this, we are told, 
is because its foundations are those of ‘the law of nature [and] natural justice’ (p. 275). 
Lundstedt’s analysis is, in this context, indubitably consistent with the organicist view he had 
expounded on earlier; while Heck’s school of thought set itself apart from the meta-juridical 
premises of the so-called jurisprudence of concepts (Begriffsjurisprudenz), it must be rejected 
for its merging of private and public interests. 
 
Law’s Existence and the Nature of Juristic Practice 
 
Few would doubt that Lundstedt’s arguments share an affinity for those sociological accounts 
that criticise legal theory and jurisprudence for being too conservative and analytic (Cotterrell 
2002). And indeed, Lundstedt’s reflections on law being a matter of social interaction and 
development rather than abstract and ideological reasoning14 easily overlap with what, a few 
years after the publication of Legal Thinking Revised, Selznick would argue regarding the 
absurdity of denying ‘the general interdependence of law and society’ (1959, p. 115). In this 
respect, Lundstedt could be easily grouped with those legal philosophers and sociologists 
who have argued that the renovation of legal education depends on the movement from the 
abstractness of the doctrinal concepts of the ‘law in books’ to the empirically verifiable 
approach of the ‘law in context’ or ‘law in action’ (among others, see Twining 2009, pp. 38–
                                                          
12 Emphasis in original. 
13 I share Spaak’s reading of Lundstedt’s legal philosophy as substantially positivistic in this respect (2014, p. 
271). See also Leiter (2001). 
14 See in particular Lundstedt’s claim that ‘[l]egal science is the science of the conditions and forms of . . . social 
individuals, and of the life of societies’ (1932, p. 331). 
9 
 
41, 117, and 225–65). Similarly, Lundstedt’s theoretical reversal, according to which it is the 
law that influences human action and expectations rather than the opposite, appears to be in 
line with Luhmann’s well-known argument that ‘[a]ll collective human life is directly or 
indirectly shaped by law’ (1985, p. 1; see also pp. 77–8, 82). 
While this context-oriented approach to law’s nature and functioning is welcome, it is my 
opinion that Lundstedt’s legal realism cannot be of assistance in overcoming the demise of 
either law’s juridical component or the teaching thereof. This is because while Lundstedt 
correctly rejects a metaphysical approach to law and legal thinking, he turns out to be a 
metaphysical theorist. To prove this, one could note the similarity between Lundstedt’s 
constructivist approach to experience and opinion that truth and untruth are ideal categories 
and Aristotle’s arguments in Metaphysics.15 Alternatively, one could point to the Thomist 
essence of Lundstedt’s claim that law serves only public utility (Sariola 198616). 
However, here I would like to draw the reader’s attention to another factor, namely, 
Lundstedt’s understanding of law as a ‘machinery’ governed by the ‘effect-cause’ 
relationship. Above all, it is the objectification of reality underpinning this image that leads 
us back to the purview of metaphysics. A similar claim was made by Bjarup in the 
aforementioned article, in which he compellingly set out the perils of a naturalistic view of 
legal education. What sets my reflections apart from those of Bjarup, however, is that Bjarup 
does not engage with the importance of the anthropological, philosophical and sociopolitical 
distinction between action and behaviour and experience and knowledge in juristic practice 
and its teaching. My aim in the following pages is therefore to show that while Lundstedt’s 
commitment is to placing the sociological character of ‘action’ at the centre of his scientific 
jurisprudence, the trajectory of his thought deprives it of its spontaneity and unpredictability, 
and thus of its humanising essence in Arendtian terms. This is done, I argue, by inscribing 
action within a structured system of mechanic determinations. 
The starting point for our reflections should be that if action is deprived of what renders it 
truly active—that is, its spontaneity and unpredictability—it inevitably follows that there is 
no need to create social order by normativistically evaluating and coordinating human 
relations. While Lundstedt seems to agree with this view (1956, pp. 48–9), his argument is 
ultimately at odds with it. To understand this fully, attention should be paid to the fact that 
Lundstedt speaks of the ‘action of people’ (p. 136) and yet argues that law is a universe of 
behavioural regularities rather than of rights and duties. It comes therefore as no surprise that, 
as noted by Spaak and mentioned earlier, Lundstedt has nothing to say on law-making and 
law-applying procedures: the sociopolitical function of the jurist becomes superfluous simply 
because the political-ontological problem of how law moves from the ideal to the factual and 
becomes the law, i.e., the combination between norm and decision (Kahn 2012), cannot be 
solved by his legal theory. From this it follows that Lundstedt’s account is wholly in line with 
the metaphysical structuring of human existence that underpins our global, transnational age 
and voids law’s regulative scope. A brief contextualisation of the ‘action-behaviour’ and 
‘experience-knowledge’ dichotomies will show this. 
 
Action-Behaviour 
 
Phenomenologically, I have been claiming, law’s existence depends on the activity of jus 
dicere, or rule-telling through juristic practice. The anthropological and sociopolitical 
function of the jurist, among whom stands the judge, is indeed that of ‘norm-alising’ our 
actions in thus creating, protecting and promoting social order. This is how, through the 
                                                          
15 Alpha, 981a 6-8, 981a 13-18, 980b 26-28, and Epsilon, 4.1207b respectively. 
16 See also Heidegger (1977, p. 64), in which the ‘earthly happiness of the greatest number’ is described as a 
metaphysical construct. 
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jurist’s existentialist function, law performs its essential regulative instances and becomes the 
law.. 
From this it follows that to absolve its coordinating purposes, (the) law needs humans to 
be free to act and define who they are as persons in Arendtian terms. This is where, I believe, 
the distinction between action and behaviour becomes all the more essential to understanding 
the crisis in legal education and practice. Needless to say, this dichotomy has been long 
studied, particularly by philosophers and political thinkers. To discuss it in all its aspects 
would require a more extensive treatment than can be provided here. Hence I would like to 
limit myself to Heidegger’s and Agamben’s conviction that action is a form of experience 
that arises out of nothingness. The self-defining properties of action depend indeed on its 
supra-logical negativity, or, as we may say, on its being phenomenologically spontaneous, 
free, non-posited, and thus groundless. 
Conversely, any form of conduct that is captivated is behavioural. Thus Heidegger, 
notwithstanding his fight against subjectivism, distinguished between human comportment as 
‘acting and doing’ and animal behaviour as ‘being driven forward’ by stimuli that captivate 
and nullify the subject’s existence (1995, pp. 232, 240; see also Agamben 2004). In other 
words, action does not need a reason, or a causa instrumentalis (Agamben 2016, p. 70). This 
explains why Arendt contended that what distinguishes action from behaviour is that the 
former is its own end.17 To speak of ‘rational action’, as many legal theorists do, is therefore 
an oxymoron that reproduces the fallacy of metaphysical thought: action is never as rational, 
nor predictable, as behaviour is. 
Conversely, reason stands among the many stimuli that guide behaviour. And indeed, 
‘reason is not self-defining’ (Kahn 2010, p. 175) simply because it is common to us all. As 
such, reason is a metaphysical construct that does not let us authoritatively and sovereignly 
experience what makes us human, and thus who we are as persons. The fact that rational 
behaviour may lead to different, individualistic outcomes should not lead us to claim 
otherwise, as it is reason itself that determines those outcomes, not us. This cannot be 
understood if we do not first comprehend that while man is the animal who reasons and 
speaks, this merely defines human qua human; it does not define me, nor the reader of these 
words, nor anybody else. It only defines humankind as a species, thus helping the interpreter 
to differentiate it from its animal and vegetable counterparts. When we pursue our own 
interests, that is, when we let our attitude be determined by the outcome of a rational 
calculation,18 we do not actively decide who we are as persons but merely dwell in what we 
should perhaps define as a procedural—as opposed to absolute—truth.  
 
Experience-Knowledge 
 
As discussed, Lundstedt’s constructivism has a precise scope: that of founding a 
jurisprudential form of scientific knowledge based on an experiential method of inquiry that 
understands human relations as mechanical regularities. Above all, it is the scientific 
preoccupation of comprehending the world as a totality along with the assumption that 
observation may lead to empirical knowledge that make Lundstedt a metaphysical thinker.  
Indeed, in expounding these views, Lundstedt turns out to be a Humanist. In particular, his 
notion of legal thinking and analysis shares the Renaissance belief that scientific investigation 
is about the methodological discovery and reconstruction of the world—which, in 
Lundstedt’s case, is reduced to a series of behavioural regularities that can be deciphered with 
absolute certainty. Lundstedt, then, acts as a new Quintus Mucius Scaevola who subscribes to 
                                                          
17 Cf. Agamben (2017, pp. 107–9). 
18  Heidegger, who believed it was inappropriate to combine action with convenience, would call it the 
‘calculating self-adjustment of ratio’ (2008, p. 217, 1998, p. 50). 
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Aristotle’s constructivist approach to experience.19 Or we may say, he acts as a Leonardo or 
even, as a young Descartes or Pascal,20 who transposes within the legal dimension the same 
paradoxical and transcendental faith in experience’s capacity to instruct science that informs 
Humanist thinking and blurs the distinction between practice and knowledge.21 And if we 
agree with Heidegger that humanism is metaphysics’ modern declension, it emerges that 
Lundstedt’s scientific estimation of the world recovers and remoulds within legal discourse 
the very essence of the same metaphysical tradition he aims to overcome. 
In order to grasp the metaphysical substratum of Lundstedt’s epistemological method and 
structuring of reality, we are, however, required to comprehend the dehumanising properties 
of behaviour and knowledge and how they operate. A good start would be to internalise the 
fact that what socioeconomic regulative processes of behaviouralisation—of which the desire 
for knowledge, standardisation, and reach is a crucial component (Rauning 2013; Agamben 
2012; Friedman 2007; Willke 2007; Adorno and Horkheimer 2002; Keohane and Nye Jr, 
2000, p. 24; Adorno 2001)—threaten is our capacity to experience what defines us as persons 
in Arendtian terms. This is why the substitution of (self-defining) action with (self-
dissolving) behaviour has occurred alongside that of (self-defining) experience with (self-
dissolving) knowledge. This is because while experience is unique and imperfect, knowledge 
looks for certainty and truth through a logic that prompts objectification, and thus, 
nullification (Heidegger 2016, pp. 7–9, 55–6, 63, 65, 101–2, 2008a, p. 118, 1982, pp. 200–2; 
Descartes 1986, p. 318; Hegel 1974; Cassirer 1957, p. 5, 1944, p. 57). Hence, even though it 
has been argued that knowledge ‘assumes that things are the way they are irrespective of our 
ability to grasp them’ (Pavlakos 2007, p. 15), the opposite is the case: knowledge functionally 
objectifies reality as behaviour functionally commodifies human existence and relations. To 
put it differently, both knowledge and behaviour phenomenologically equalise the targets of 
their reach for regulative and structuralising purposes, thus emptying their constituting 
properties as well as the unpredictability of their inter-action.  
This may sound strange or even inappropriate, considering how deeply the inconsistencies 
or sheer metaphysical speculations (Arendt 1978, p. 157) of German idealism’s 
systematisation of reality, as well as the ‘technologisation’ of the spirit described by 
Heidegger (2014, pp. 209–10), have influenced Western development over the last two 
centuries. It could therefore be asked, with good reason, whether global and transnational 
legal theorists have in fact even noticed the substitution of experience with knowledge 
(Ladeur 2011; Quack 2016). And indeed, one may question whether knowledge and 
experience can be analytically differentiated in the first place, and thus whether separating 
them will help us comprehend what law and juristic practice are about and currently 
undergoing.  
To address these issues, I submit, we need to delve into the role that knowledge plays in 
scientific inquiry, which in turn serves to explain its metaphysical and logical essence. In 
addition to such Humanists as Zabarella, according to whom knowing is an impersonal 
function, one may reference Heidegger, Agamben, and Cassirer in this respect as well. 
Heidegger famously contended that, through science,22 ‘[t]he real becomes secured in its 
objectness’ (2013a, p. 168; see also 2013b). This is because science’s purpose is to ‘se[t] 
                                                          
19 Metaphysics, Alpha, 980b–981b; Stein (1990, pp. 36–7). 
20 On Descartes’s humanistic thought, see Negri (2007, pp. 24–102). On Leonardo and Pascal, see Wootton 
(2016, pp. 53, 297, 417). 
21 I refer to the Aristotelian naturalism of Pietro Pompanazzi and Giacomo Zabarella. For an introduction, see 
Randall (1956, pp. 257–79). 
22 It should be noted that Heidegger distinguished between ‘ancient’ science, which he considered favourably, 
and its ‘modern’ counterpart, which he vehemently condemned. The quoted remarks refer to the latter notion. 
See also Heidegger (2013c, p. 79, 2012, 2008b). 
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upon the real [by] order[ing] it into place to the end that at any given time the real will exhibit 
itself as an interacting network, i.e., in surveyable series of related causes’ (2013a, pp. 167–8; 
see also 1982, pp. 320–4). Agamben drew on this tradition of thought in a short but valuable 
essay on the humanising character of experience which embraces Walter Benjamin’s belief 
that modern society is devoid of it. In particular, Agamben showed that while science is 
aimed at achieving verifiable knowledge, experience ‘is incompatible with certainty 
[because] once an experience has become measurable and certain, it immediately loses its 
authority’ (2007, p. 20). Combining these accounts with that of Cassirer on the lack of 
‘personal and anthropomorphic elements’ in scientific enquiry, quoted at the beginning of 
this article, reveals that, along with action, the self-defining, finite, and relative character of 
experience is what constitutes human uniqueness. 
What matters for our purposes here is that (scientific) knowledge is a metaphysical 
construct that achieves its equalising and objectifying aims by using the ground-giving 
properties of logic to connect a ‘cause’ to an ‘effect’ dialectically. My use of the term 
‘metaphysics’ here is Heideggerian, as by it I refer to the science that looks at beings and 
phenomena comprehensively (i.e., as a whole) with the aim of systematising them according 
to a common feature that they all share. 23  Metaphysics, then, transcends the factual 
singularity of beings and phenomena, including human beings and relations, as a way to 
structure (and, thus, equalise and objectify) them in a given order of reference that may be 
cognitively accessed through judgment.24 
It would be impossible to describe in a few words how logic’s rationality has neutralised 
the finitude and immanent actuality of experience in favour of transcendental knowledge 
(Heidegger 2014, pp. 198–9, 2008b, pp. 304–5). This would require an engagement with 
ancient, medieval, and modern metaphysical thinkers, such as Cicero, Thomas Aquinas, 
Descartes, Hobbes, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel, according to whom truth—that is, reality as 
certitudo—resides in the word (Cassirer 2010, 1955, p. 129, 2009; Heidegger 2008b, 2008a, 
1998, 1984, 1982; Stein 1966, p. 42).25  
In this sense, to prove that logic’s dialectical nature serves metaphysics’ cognitive and 
structuring purposes, one might also note that both find their seed in Platonic and Aristotelian 
philosophy.26 Since Plato’s Sophist and what Aristotle called Organon, logic has indeed been 
the metaphysical science that looks for coherence between statement and meaning by 
deactivating the principle of non-contradiction with the aim of construing a systematic unity 
in which subject and predicate coincide. Hence Derrida’s condemnation of metaphysic for 
‘keep[ing] the outside out [through] the inaugural gesture of “logic”’ (1981, p. 128). In other 
words, logic dialectically connects elements of reality by transcending their spatiality and 
temporality and including them in an all-encompassing totality through judgement so that 
they can be known (Cassirer 2009, p. 253). This is how experience is nullified, knowledge 
produced and reality explained by scientific means: by metaphysically deactivating the 
factuality and ambiguity of beings and phenomena through a dialectical process that 
                                                          
23 See also Cassirer (1955, pp. 76–7). 
24 Hence Heidegger writes that, in Kant, ‘cognitive truth’ is the ‘truth of judgment [which] becomes the standard 
for the object or, more precisely, for objectivity’ (1982, p. 201).  
25 I want to thank James Gordley for the constructive feedback on this point. While Gordley concedes that 
rationalism is dehumanising, he disagrees with me regarding early and modern metaphysics being two 
manifestations of the same phenomenon. 
26 As Cassirer showed, according to Plato’s ‘cognitive value of language . . . the reality of things can be 
apprehended only in the truth of concepts’. Hence, in Platonic idealism, ‘the “things” of common experience . . . 
become “images,” whose truth content lies not in what they immediately are but in what they mediately express’ 
(1955, pp. 124–5).  
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replicates them within a given framework of intelligibility.27 Thus Heidegger aptly speaks of 
the ‘metaphysical foundations of logic’ (1984, 2002, p. 4).28 
 
Law’s Existence and the Apprehension of Juristic Practice 
 
Given the foregoing discussion on knowledge’s objectifying properties, it should come as no 
surprise that Heidegger refused to speak of ‘cognition’ and opted instead for a definition of 
knowing based on experiential terms such as ‘apprehending’ and ‘understanding’ (1982, pp. 
275–330, 1998, pp. 11–2; 2014, p. 215). Indeed, according to Heidegger—who, as stressed 
by Arendt and Glenn Gray, was above all a teacher—the movement from the 
conceptualisation of teaching and learning as experiential apprehending and understanding to 
scientific knowing has to be inscribed within the origination of metaphysical and logical 
thinking ‘in the ambit of the administration of the Platonic-Aristotelian schools’ (2014, p. 
153). Yet the role that Stoicism, in its promotion of the metaphysical structuring of thinking 
and language, has played in this process cannot be ignored (Long 2001, pp. 85–106; 
Heidegger 1984, p. 4). It was only through the Stoics’ preaching, indeed, that the ‘truth’ of 
the predicate started to be evaluated by making it coincide with the subject’s assertion. In this 
way, logos was instrumentally transformed into logic so that thinking could become a way of 
positing and structuring—and thus, transcending—reality by metaphysical means.  
In terms of the legal dimension, the spark of this constructivist process has to be found in 
the influence of such Stoics as Mucius and Servius on Roman juristic practice: with them, the 
experiential essence of legal reasoning and the apprehension of its practice were reduced to a 
transcendental, logical, and cognitivist endeavour. As Schiavone has shown, this shift 
occurred alongside ‘the metamorphosis of law from an act of will into an act of knowledge’ 
(2012, p. 245; see also Stein 1980, pp. 6–47; critically, see Tuori 2004). After the Glossators’ 
scientific didactics, based on Aristotle’s Logic, established itself throughout Italy and Europe 
(Berman 1983, pp. 132–51; Padoa Schioppa 2007, pp. 87–98, 149), legal theory was easily 
able to develop along this metaphysical path to become wholly rational, logical, and 
constructivist in modern times ).29 
The profound impact that Stoic structuralism, reason-oriented universalism, and 
mathematics have had on modern political and legal thinking ought to be appreciated from 
this perspective (Cassirer 1946, pp. 163–75).30 Amongst the innumerable examples one might 
give in this respect, it will suffice to point to Grotius’s, Hobbes’s, Pufendorf’s, Wolff’s, 
Montesquieu’s, and Voltaire’s mathematical treatment of politics and law. Alternatively, one 
might point to Lord Kames’ belief that law is a rational science; to Leibniz’s famous 
contention that jurisprudence is not based on experience because law and justice depend on 
logical analysis like arithmetic; to Savigny’s collaboration with Wilhelm von Humboldt to 
create a model of higher education environment entirely based on scientific research; or 
                                                          
27 Critical lawyers have not failed to notice this. See Douzinas and Gearey (2005, pp. 43–5). 
28 Cassirer too describes metaphysic as based on a ‘logical process’ that hooks the ‘concept of the thing and the 
concept of causality’ so that ‘what cannot be converted into such a relation . . . remains ultimately intelligible’ 
(1957, p. 94). Cassirer returned to this point in writings later in his life, when describing why the knowledge 
pursued by the philosophy of the Enlightenment brought to completion a reason-oriented approach to reality that 
for the sake of objectifying it as a whole ‘dissolves . . .  everything merely factual, all simple data of experience . 
. . tradition and authority’ using logic as its medium (2009, pp. 13, 244–74). 
29 See Heidegger (2013c, p. 34): ‘[i]n the modern age . . . we [have come to] know rigorous thinking only as 
conceptual representation’ (emphasis in original). More broadly, see Habermas’ description of modernity as a 
dimension in which cognitive procedures and normative expectations fully met and inform each other (1997).  
30 Hence Giacomo Marramao places measurement, conventionalism, and rationalism at the centre of modern 
secularisation and its voiding of experience (2005.  
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finally, to Puchta’s scientific positivism31 (Cassirer 2009, pp. 234–74; Padoa Schioppa 2007, 
pp. 504–8; Stein 1980, p. 25). 
In our ‘flat’ world, where the reason-oriented behaviouralisation and standardisation of 
human existence and relations have been diffused globally through the spread of the 
‘civilised economy’ and ‘good economic governance’ paradigms,32 this trend has reached its 
apex and drained the relationship between juristic practice and the human condition of its 
significance. Needless to say, the inclusion of social science knowledge in the legal domain 
has profoundly influenced this process—as is made evident by the spread of artificial 
intelligence discourse in the development of legal practices and of computational models of 
legal knowledge, reasoning, and decision-making. Hence, twenty years after having warned 
against law’s ‘epistemic trap’ and advocated a pure form of legal epistemology based on a 
constructivist conceptualisation of reality (1989, pp. 730, 732), Teubner suggested that 
jurisprudence should stop adopting the ‘empirical results or theoretical insights from the other 
social sciences’ (2009, p. 4, 1989).33 Not coincidentally, this view is diametrically opposed to 
that of those contemporary Scandinavian legal realists who endorse Lundstedt’s constructivist 
approach to the legal enterprise and argue for a sociological theory of law centred around the 
dynamics that inform the knowledge-oriented economy of our time (Petrusson and Glavå 
2012). This approach, however, fails to realise that the existential crisis faced by law schools 
and the legal professions is structurally related to the transformation of normative thinking 
into a system of knowledge—which leads to the completion of the methodological 
relativisation34 of reality and rationalisation of human existence that inform the Western 
metaphysical tradition. 
What emerges from the foregoing analysis is, then, that the mechanical rationalisation of 
human conduct renders the regulatory function of the activity of jus dicere, as well as its 
apprehension, superfluous. The reason for this should be obvious: If humans no longer 
unpredictably inter-act, thus defining who they are as persons, but merely behave according 
to reason-oriented schemes of social interaction that may be mechanically planned and/or 
decoded, there is no need for the coordinating function of juristic practice. Or, we may say, 
there is no need for the jurist to create social order by ‘norm-alising’ the instability and 
spontaneity of our actions. That is why, according to Sacco, for something like law to exist, 
the subject has to decide how to act. From this it follows that law is, and can only be, an 
anthropological tool which animals do not need: as their conduct is guided by behavioural 
stimuli, all they need is rules. Hence there is neither room for law nor the jurist in the animal 
world (2007, p. 19).35 
The emergence of hybrid functional equivalents to law, among which stand networks and 
similar regulatory structures at the macro, meso, and micro levels is testament to the crisis of 
law’s juridical component (Zumbansen 2015b, p. 102; Dietz 2014; Teubner 2012, 2011, 
2009). The same may be said in regard to what global and transnational legal scholars 
commonly describe as the transformations of public law and its accountability schemes, or to 
the fact that state functions are increasingly delegated to the private sector and spread among 
multiple orderings of society without legitimate authorisation and efficient supervision. 
                                                          
31 Not coincidentally, Puchta is the first commentator to explicitly describe Quintus Mucius Scaevola as the 
jurist who introduced the scientific approach to law. 
32Both terms relate to the belief that governments should educate consumers, as well as build or reform 
institutions and regulate economic activities, according to rational global standards determined by outsiders 
(Friedman 2007, pp. 51–9 and 201–39). 
33 Cf, Vick (2004));Schrama (2011). 
34  Or ‘approximation’, which is the term that Heidegger uses in the first volume of his Nietzsche when 
describing what characterises the Platonic conception of knowledge. 
35 Cf. Agamben (2017). 
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If this is correct, or at least plausible, the nihilism that currently affects juristic practice can 
only be defeated through an anthropological and sociopolitical turn: from the ‘(non-)human’ 
who behaves rationally according to scientific schemes of social interactions, to the human 
who acts spontaneously and whose decisions must be normativistically interpreted. Only 
through the individual’s reappropriation of his or her ability to act, and thus experience him- 
or herself in his or her uniqueness in Arendtian terms, will the activity of jus dicere be again 
a median between society’s need for order and coordination, and law’s performative 
instances. 
 
Conclusion 
 
According to Richard and Daniel Susskind, in a few decades we will be living in the ‘post-
professional society’—that is to say, in a form of society ‘[…] in which today’s professions 
will play a much less prominent role’ (2015, pp. 301, 271). Juristic practice is, of course, no 
exception. As discussed, scholars tend to identify the reasons for this fast-evolving 
development in the processes of digitalization and automation that shape our global and 
transnational age. The argument pursued by this article is that the seed of this phenomenon 
ought to be found in law’s scientification as brought about by the metaphysical construction 
of reality. The reason-oriented behaviouralisation and standardisation of human existence and 
relations pursued by metaphysics’ constructivism and the demise of the jurist’s 
anthropological and sociopolitical function meet in a zone of interaction. 
Over the past years, a great many compelling arguments have been put forward in the 
wake of contextualising the impact that knowledge’s objectifying properties has on law’s 
existence and performativity (Riles 2008; Ladeur 2011).  The question that is yet to be 
answered is, however, how can the suffering of juristic practice be cured? For my own part, I 
believe that the successful training of young lawyers for the highly contested, liquid 
environment of our time depends not only on which kind of materials we will bring into the 
field, nor will it be determined solely by the methodologies through which we will widen the 
interdisciplinary spectrum of legal education and pedagogy.36 First and foremost, the healthy 
development of a newly contextualised discipline of law and justice will rest on whether we 
are able to internalise that law is not a science. Rather, it is an ars37 that falls outside the 
purview of knowledge, and as such can only be apprehended through an act of experience. 
This requires us, as teachers, to comprehend that the suffering of law’s juridical 
component is part of the crisis regarding what makes us human. The reason for this, as 
discussed, is that processes of behaviouralisation render the anthropological and 
sociopolitical function of the jurist superfluous. If humans stop acting because their conduct 
can be mechanically planned and/or decoded by a system of rational and causal behavioural 
connections, there is no need for a legal expert to evaluate their inter-action in light of law’s 
coordinative instances. In short, this means that there is no need for ‘(non-)humans’ to 
depend on the jurist’s anthropological and sociopolitical function of jus dicere. 
Hence, rather than merely forming future global and transnational law professionals for 
the post-professional society, we should first aim to train humans38 experienced in law and 
global and transnational issues who are capable of working efficiently—and thus, making 
sense of themselves as persons—in a diffusionist regulatory landscape as teachers, 
solicitors/barristers, judges, or legislators. If we opt for this approach, then a counter-
                                                          
36 A recent example is the Solicitors Qualifying Examinations for England and Wales, which will come into 
operation in September 2020. 
37 Needless to say, this term is not used here in a Ciceronian fashion. 
38 See Domingo (2001, p. 121), in which the task of forming a global law as a ‘Law of Humanity’ is left to the 
jurists. 
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movement from self-dissolving knowledge and rational behaviour to self-affirming 
experience and action will be required. Lundstedt’s scientific jurisprudence cannot be of 
assistance in this enterprise. 
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